Séminaire

Monologues, Dialogues, and Common Priors

Alfredo Di Tillio (Bocconi University)

18 mai 2021, 17h00–18h30

Zoom

Economic Theory Seminar

Résumé

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a simple criterion enabling to conclude that two agents do not share a common prior. The criterion is simple, as it does not require information about the agents' knowledge and beliefs, but rather only the record of a dialogue between the agents. In each stage of the dialogue the agents tell each other the probability they ascribe to a fixed event and update their beliefs about the event. To characterize dialogues consistent with a common prior, we first study monologues, which are sequences of probabilities assigned by a single agent to a given event in an exogenous learning process. A dialogue is consistent with a common prior if and only if each selection sequence from the two monologues comprising the dialogue is itself a monologue.

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