Séminaire

Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, and the Theory of the Firm

José Azar (IESE Business School, Universidad de Navarra)

9 octobre 2017, 12h30–14h00

Salle MF 323

Fédération des Banques Françaises Seminar

Résumé

This paper develops a model of firm behavior in the context of oligopoly and portfolio diversification by shareholders. The management of each firm proposes a strategic plan to shareholders, and is evaluated based on the strategic plan. This leads to internalization and aggregation of shareholder objectives, including holdings in other firms, and situations where consumers/workers are also shareholders. When all shareholders hold market portfolios, firms that are formally separate behave as a single firm. I introduce new indices that capture the internalization effects from consumer/worker control, and discuss implications for antitrust, stakeholder theory, and the boundaries of the firm.

Voir aussi