Résumé
We present a stylized model of three entrepreneurial financing methods based on two tradeoffs. First, token financing and crowdfunding reveal consumer-investors’ demand for the product prior to investment, but upfront purchase weakens the entrepreneur’s incentive to deliver. Second, token financing permits a bubble component in token value, but reduces consumer surplus because tokens are stored rather than consumed. We characterize the conditions under which entrepreneurs prefer each financing method. We show that token financing can fund socially efficient projects that cannot be funded through equity or crowdfunding, but leads to suboptimal consumption. Finally, we propose an implementable hurdle condition for regulators.
Mots-clés
financement participatif, financement des entreprises, offre initiale de jetons, réglementation des jetons, jeton utilitaire; utility token;
Codes JEL
- G32: Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
- G38: Government Policy and Regulation
- L26: Entrepreneurship
Remplacé par
Ulrich Hege, Edmond Baranes et Jin-Hyuk Kim, « Token Financing vs. Equity and Crowdfunding », Economics Letters, 2026, à paraître.
Référence
Ulrich Hege, Edmond Baranes et Jin-Hyuk Kim, « Token Financing vs. Equity and Crowdfunding », TSE Working Paper, mars 2026.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, mars 2026
