Regulating Physicians’ Prices in the Presence of Health Platforms

Résumé

Online platforms connecting physicians and patients are increasingly com-mon and often operate in heavily regulated contexts. We consider a platform that provides cost-reducing services for physicians and quality-enhancing ser-vices for patients. The platform also improves the matching between patients and physicians, thereby increasing competition among the latter. When prices are unregulated, physicians charge different prices online and offline, yet not all join the platform, which is suboptimal in terms of social welfare. The platform may also under- or over-invest in the quality level offered to patients, making their participation suboptimal as well. We then analyze price regulation. Un-der a single regulated price for medical visits, regardless of the booking channel, all physicians join the platform. However, the first-best allocation cannot be implemented: patient participation remains inefficiently low because patients do not internalize the platform’s cost-reducing effect. In contrast, allowing two regulated prices, one for offline visits and one for platform bookings, re-stores the first best. Overall, our findings suggest that an optimal pricing or reimbursement mechanism should differentiate across booking channels.

Mots-clés

Codes JEL

Référence

Chiara Canta, Leonardo Madio, Andrea Mantovani et Carlo Reggiani, « Regulating Physicians’ Prices in the Presence of Health Platforms », TSE Working Paper, n° 26-1741, avril 2026.