Document de travail

Public and private incentives for self-protection

Nicolas Treich et François Salanié

Résumé

Governments sometimes encourage or impose individual self-protection measures, such as wearing a protective mask when going outside during an epidemic. However, by reducing the risk of being infected by others, more self-protection may lead each individual to go outside more often. In the absence of lockdown, this creates a “collective offsetting effect”, since more people outside means that the risk of infection is increased for all. Yet, wearing masks also creates a positive externality on others, by reducing the risk of infecting them. We show how to integrate these different effects in a simple model, and we discuss when self-protection efforts should be encouraged (or deterred) by a social planner.

Remplacé par

François Salanié et Nicolas Treich, « Public and private incentives for self-protection », The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, vol. 45, n° 2, juillet 2020, p. 104–113.

Référence

Nicolas Treich et François Salanié, « Public and private incentives for self-protection », TSE Working Paper, n° 20-1090, avril 2020.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 20-1090, avril 2020