Document de travail

Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation

Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa et Patrick Rey

Résumé

Procuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unverifiable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the tradeoff via two instruments: a monetary prize and a contract to implement the project. The optimal mechanism favors the innovator in contract allocation when the value of innovation is above a certain threshold, and handicaps the innovator otherwise. A monetary prize is employed as an additional incentive but only when the value of innovation is suficiently high.

Mots-clés

Contract rights; Inducement Prizes; Innovation; Procurement and R&D;

Codes JEL

  • D44: Auctions
  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • H57: Procurement
  • O31: Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
  • O38: Government Policy
  • O39: Other

Référence

Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa et Patrick Rey, « Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-695, septembre 2016, révision décembre 2017.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 16-695, septembre 2016, révision décembre 2017