Résumé
This paper examines how horizontal mergers affect firms’ incentives to invest in R&D leading to the development of new products. We characterize the impact of a merger to monopoly and a 3-to-2 merger on equilibrium innovation efforts and consumer surplus, absent efficiency gains and spillovers. We show that a 3-to-2 merger directly alters the outsider’s innovation incentives by shifting its best-response function upward, and we analyze how this mechanism affects merger outcomes for innovation and consumer surplus. Finally, we examine how efficiency gains and remedies modify post-merger innovation efforts.
Mots-clés
Horizontal Mergers, Product Innovation, R&D Investments.;
Codes JEL
- K21: Antitrust Law
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L40: General
Référence
Anna D’Annunzio, Bruno Jullien, Yassine Lefouili et Leonardo Madio, « Mergers and Investments in New Products », TSE Working Paper, n° 18-949, août 2018, révision décembre 2025.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 18-949, août 2018, révision décembre 2025
