Résumé
We use data from a platform that centralizes day care matching and estimate parents’ preferences and nursery priorities from rank-ordered lists and acceptance decisions. Our novel estimation approach, inspired by dynamic discrete choice models, accounts for strategic behavior. We then evaluate centralized matching policies, comparing mechanisms and assessing the effects of subsidies, increased capacity, and affirmative action. We find that affirmative action is key to increasing participation of disadvantaged children, though it can raise segregation due to strong differences in preferences.
Mots-clés
day care, affirmative action, segregation, centralized matching markets, CCP estimation;
Codes JEL
- C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- I24: Education and Inequality
Référence
Olivier De Groote et Minyoung Rho, « Matching disadvantaged children to day care: Evidence from a centralized platform », TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1600, décembre 2024, révision février 2026.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 24-1600, décembre 2024, révision février 2026