Document de travail

Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market

Bruno Biais, Christophe Bisière et Sébastien Pouget

Résumé

We experimentally analyze equilibrium discovery in i) a pure call auction, ii) a call auction preceded by a nonbinding preopening period, and iii) a call auction preceded by a binding preopening period. We examine whether a preopening period can facilitate coordination on the Pareto dominant equilibrium. During the nonbinding preopening period, traders tend to place manipulative orders. After observing such orders, participants learn to distrust cheap talk and coordinate less on Pareto dominant outcomes. In contrast, we find that, when preopening orders are binding, they improve the ability to coordinate on high gains from trade.

Remplacé par

Bruno Biais, Christophe Bisière et Sébastien Pouget, « Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market », Management Science, vol. 60, n° 3, mars 2014.

Référence

Bruno Biais, Christophe Bisière et Sébastien Pouget, « Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market », TSE Working Paper, n° 09-001, janvier 2009.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 09-001, janvier 2009