Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection

Résumé

This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market tari making additional trades with an entrant unprotable. Motivated by the recursive structure of this allocation, we nally show that it emerges as the essentially unique equilibrium outcome of a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets..

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Remplacé par

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié, « Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection », American Economic Review, vol. 111, n° 8, août 2021, p. 2623–2659.

Référence

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié, « Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection », TSE Working Paper, n° 17-788, mars 2017, révision janvier 2021.