Document de travail

Dominance and Competitive Bundling

Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci

Résumé

We study bundling by a dominant multi-product firm facing competition from a rival multi-product firm. Compared to competition under independent pricing, competition under pure bundling reduces (increases) each firm's profit for low (high) levels of dominance, while for intermediate levels of dominance, it increases the dominant firm's profit but reduces the rival's profit. The latter result provides a justification for the use of contractual bundling to build entry barrier. When we allow for mixed bundling, we find a threshold level of dominance above which the unique outcome is the one under pure bundling.

Codes JEL

  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

Remplacé par

Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci, « Dominance and Competitive Bundling », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11, n° 3, août 2019, p. 1–33.

Référence

Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci, « Dominance and Competitive Bundling », TSE Working Paper, n° 13-423, 13 août 2013, révision mai 2018.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 13-423, 13 août 2013, révision mai 2018