Document de travail

Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor

Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari et Pierre Pestieau

Résumé

When accidental bequests signal otherwise unobservable individual characteristics such as productivity and longevity, the tax administration should partition the population into two groups: One consisting of people who do not receive an inheritance and the other of those who do. The first tagged group gets a second-best tax à la Mirrlees; the second group a first-best tax schedule. The solution implies that receiving an inheritance makes high-ability types worse off and low-ability types better off. High-ability individuals will necessarily face a bequest tax of more than 100%, while low-ability types face a bequest tax that can be smaller as well as larger than 100%. With a Rawlsian social welfare function, the low-ability types too face a more than 100% tax on bequests.

Mots-clés

Accidental bequests; estate tax; tagging; first best; second best;

Codes JEL

  • H21: Efficiency • Optimal Taxation

Remplacé par

Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari et Pierre Pestieau, « Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor », The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 114, n° 4, décembre 2012, p. 1437–1459.

Référence

Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari et Pierre Pestieau, « Accidental bequests: a curse for the rich and a boon for the poor », TSE Working Paper, n° 09-119, novembre 2009.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 09-119, novembre 2009