Article

Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Paraguay

Karine Van Der Straeten, Rumilda Cañete, Stéphane Straub et Josepa Miquel-Florensa

Résumé

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that giving voters more power – both formally through the use of more “open” electoral systems and informally through easier access to information on politicians’ wrongdoings – will necessarily result in them voting corrupt politicians out of office. Focusing on a comparison between closed-list and open-list proportional representation systems, we theoretically show that opening the lists is likely to generate a large shift of vote shares in favor of the incumbent parties, which in many countries happen to be the most corrupt. We design a survey experiment to test these predictions in Paraguay and find strong supporting evidence. We do not find in our context that the lack of information is a major obstacle preventing voters from voting out corrupt politicians; if anything, under the more open system, supporters of the incumbent party tend to cast more votes for politicians with a recent history of corruption.

Mots-clés

Corruption; Electoral systems; Information;

Remplace

Rumilda Cañete, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Stéphane Straub et Karine Van Der Straeten, « Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Paraguay », TSE Working Paper, n° 20-1063, janvier 2020.

Référence

Karine Van Der Straeten, Rumilda Cañete, Stéphane Straub et Josepa Miquel-Florensa, « Voting Corrupt Politicians Out of Office? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Paraguay », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 179, novembre 2020, p. 223–239.

Publié dans

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol. 179, novembre 2020, p. 223–239