Résumé
We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.
Mots-clés
Priority-based allocation; Efficiency; Stability; Incentive Compatibility; Pseudo-Market Approach;
Codes JEL
- C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- I29: Other
Remplace
Yinghua He, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia et Jianye Yan, « A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities », TSE Working Paper, n° 15-601, septembre 2015, révision juillet 2017.
Référence
Yinghua He, Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia et Jianye Yan, « A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 10, n° 3, août 2018, p. 272–314.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 10, n° 3, août 2018, p. 272–314