Résumé
We study efficient non-linear taxation of labour and capital in a dynamic Mirrleesian model incorporating political economy constraints. Policies are chosen sequentially over time, without commitment. Our main result is that the marginal tax on capital income is progressive, in the sense that richer agents face higher marginal tax rates.
Mots-clés
Capital taxation; Political economy; Progressivity; Mirrlees;
Codes JEL
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D86: Economics of Contract: Theory
- E61: Policy Objectives • Policy Designs and Consistency • Policy Coordination
- H21: Efficiency • Optimal Taxation
Référence
Emmanuel Farhi, Christopher Sleet, Ivan Werning et Sevin Yeltekin, « Non-linear Capital Taxation Without Commitment », The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, 2012, p. 1469–1493.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, 2012, p. 1469–1493