Article

How Much Do Cartels Overcharge?

Marcel Boyer et Rachidi Kotchoni

Résumé

Connor and Lande (Issues in competition law and policy, pp 2203–2218, 2008) conducted a survey of cartels and found a mean overcharge estimate in the range of 31–49 %. By examining more sources, Connor (Price-fixing overcharges, 2nd edn. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1610262, 2010) finds a mean of 50.4 % for successful cartels. However, the data that are used in those studies are estimates that are obtained from different methodologies, sources, and contexts rather than from direct observation. We conduct a meta-analysis of cartel overcharge estimates that provides a sound treatment of these matters and other data problems. We find a bias-corrected mean and median overcharge estimate of 15.47 and 16.01 %. Our results have significant antitrust policy implications.

Mots-clés

Antitrust; Cartel overcharges; Heckman correction; Antitrust Cartel overcharges; Kullback–Leibler divergence; Meta-analysis;

Remplace

Marcel Boyer et Rachidi Kotchoni, « How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? », TSE Working Paper, n° 14-462, 31 janvier 2014, révision juillet 2015.

Référence

Marcel Boyer et Rachidi Kotchoni, « How Much Do Cartels Overcharge? », Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 47, n° 2, septembre 2015, p. 119–153.

Publié dans

Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 47, n° 2, septembre 2015, p. 119–153