Résumé
Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and sequentially decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then simple censorship policies are often constrained efficient as shown by a novel method of calculus of variations.
Mots-clés
cream skimming, matching markets, market failure, information design, calculus of variations;
Codes JEL
- C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
- C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
Référence
Alex Smolin et Gleb Romanyuk, « Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11, n° 2, mai 2019, p. 250–276.
Publié dans
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 11, n° 2, mai 2019, p. 250–276