We study games in which several principals design mechanisms in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each type of each agent can participate with at most one principal and meaningfully communicate only with him. Exclusive competition is at the centre stage of recent analyses of markets with private information. Economic models of exclusive competition restrict principals to use standard direct mechanisms, which induce truthful revelation of agents’ exogenous private information. This paper investigates the rationale for this restriction. We provide two results. First, we construct an economic example showing that direct mechanisms fail to completely characterize equilibrium outcomes even if we restrict to pure strategy equilibria. Second, we show that truth-telling strongly robust equilibrium outcomes survive against principals’ unilateral deviations toward arbitrary mechanisms.
Competing Mechanisms; Exclusive Competition; Incomplete Information;
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni et Gwenaël Piaser, « On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition », TSE Working Paper, n° 15-609, novembre 2015.
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni et Gwenaël Piaser, « On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition », Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 111, septembre 2018, p. 1–15.
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 111, septembre 2018, p. 1–15