Résumé
The aim of this paper is to compare different environmental policies for cost-effective habitat conservation on agricultural lands, when the desired spatial pattern of reserves is a random mosaic. We use a spatially explicit mathematical programming model which studies the farmers' behavior as profit maximizers under technical and administrative constraints. Facing different policy measures, each farmer chooses the land-use on each field, which determines the landscape at the regional level. A spatial pattern index (Ripley L function) is then associated to the obtained landscape, indicating on the degree of dispersion of the reserve. We compare a subsidy per hectare of reserve with an auction scheme and an agglomeration malus. We find that the auction is superior to the uniform subsidy for cost-efficiency. The agglomeration malus does better than the auction for the spatial pattern but is more costly.
Mots-clés
Agri-environmental policies; Biodiversity; Spatial pattern; Mathematical programming; Auction schemes; Agglomeration bonus/malus;
Codes JEL
- H23: Externalities • Redistributive Effects • Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- Q12: Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
- Q28: Government Policy
- Q58: Government Policy
Référence
Laure Bamière, Maia David et Bruno Vermont, « Agri-environmental policies for biodiversity when the spatial pattern of the reserve matters », Ecological Economics, vol. 85, janvier 2013, p. 97–104.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Ecological Economics, vol. 85, janvier 2013, p. 97–104