Jump to navigation
9 décembre 2015
Frédéric Cherbonnier
3 décembre 2015
Céline Nauges
2 décembre 2015
Simon Dietz, Christian Gollier et Louise Kessler
n° 15-608, novembre 2015
Mitigation reduces the expected future damages from climate change,flbut how does it affect the aggregate risk borne by future generations?flThis raises the question of the ‘climate beta’, i.e., the elasticity of climatefldamages with respect to a change in aggregate consumption. Inflthis paper we...
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni et Gwenaël Piaser
n° 15-609, novembre 2015
We study games in which several principals design incentive schemes in the presence of privately informed agents. Competition is exclusive: each agent can participate with at most one principal, and principal-agents corporations are isolated. We analyze the role of standard incentive compatible...
Alban Moura
n° 15-610, novembre 2015
This paper uses an estimated sticky-price model to identify endogenous movements in government consumption in the U.S. economy. Two feedback effects are considered, one originating from the stock of public debt and one from contemporaneous output. The data provide significant statistical evidence...
Céline Nauges et Sarah Ann Wheeler
n° 15-611, novembre 2015, révision juillet 2016
Climate change will require commitment by all levels of the community, but there is still uncertainty surrounding the best way to influence individual mitigation behaviour. This study analyses household survey data on water and energy climate change mitigation behaviour from eleven OECD countries...
n° 15-612, novembre 2015
I incorporate investment price rigidity in a two-sector monetary model of business cycles. Fit to quarterly U.S. time series, the model suggests that price sluggishness in the investment sector is the single most empirically relevant friction to match the data. Sticky investment prices constitute...
Eric Avenel et Stéphane Caprice
n° 15-613, novembre 2015
L'article revisite la question de la soutenabilité d'une entente en présence d'une menace d'entrée dans un contexte où les firmes en place sont verticalement intégrées. Les entrants dépendent des firmes intégrées pour leurs approvisionnements. Alors que l'entrée laisse les profits de collusion...
Tim Lee
novembre 2015
