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Yeon-Koo Che, Elisabetta Iossa et Patrick Rey
n° 16-695, septembre 2016, révision novembre 2020
Procuring an innovation involves motivating a research effort to generate a new idea and then implementing that idea efficiently. If research efforts are unveriable and implementation costs are private information, a trade-off arises between the two objectives. The optimal mechanism resolves the...
Daniel L. Chen
n° 16-692, septembre 2016
Scholars since Hume and Smith have debated possible causal connections between market experiences and moral beliefs. Of particular interest today are questions related to incentive designs: for example, could the structure of employment affect moral attitudes? Here, I study the impact of employment...
Daniel L. Chen et Susan Yeh
n° 16-693, septembre 2016
Is it justified for states to appropriate private property rights? If so, should governments expropriate or regulate?We test three conventional views: insecure property rights cause underinvestment, moral hazard cause overinvestment, or public use cause economic growth.We embed these mechanisms in...
Daniel L. Chen, Moti Michaeli et Daniel Spiro
n° 16-694, septembre 2016
Studying a high-stakes field setting, we examine which individuals, on an ideological scale, conform more to the opinion of others. In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, legal precedents are set by ideologically diverse and randomly composed panels of judges. Using exogenous predictors of ideology and...
Patrick Fève, Tannous Kass-Hanna et Mario Pietrunti
n° 16-696, septembre 2016
This paper provides an analytical characterization of the effects of noisy news shocks on fiscal policy. We consider a small-scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with capital accumulation and endogenous labor supply and show that noise dampens the propagation of anticipated...
Philippe Gagnepain et Marc Ivaldi
n° 16-697, septembre 2016
This article focuses on the life insurance industry in France and attempts to shed light on whether the insurers behave in a competitive fashion, or whether, on the contrary, they take coordinated decisions. We propose several empirical tests, which entail the estimation of the Boone indicator, a...
Katrin Cremers, Fabian Gaessler, Dietmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers et Yassine Lefouili
n° 16-698, septembre 2016
In bifurcated patent litigation systems, claims of infringement and validity of a patent are decided independently of each other in separate court proceedings at different courts. In non-bifurcated systems, infringement and validity are decided jointly in the same proceedings at a single court. We...
Fred Schroyen et Nicolas Treich
n° 16-699, septembre 2016
The relationship between wealth and power has long been debated. Nevertheless, this relationship has been rarely studied in a strategic game. In this paper, we study wealth effects in a strategic contest game. Two opposing effects arise: wealth reduces the marginal cost of effort but it also...
Jean-Paul Azam et Mario Ferrero
n° 16-700, septembre 2016
Ingela Alger et Jörgen W. Weibull
n° 16-702, septembre 2016
Since the publication of Adam Smithís Wealth of Nations, it has been customary among economists to presume that economic agents are purely selfinterested. However, research in experimental and behavioral economics has shown that human motivation is more complex and that observed behavior is often...
