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Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1676, octobre 2025
Firms often choose between concentrated, renegotiable bank claims and dispersed, arm’s-length market debt. I develop a tractable adverse-selection model in which both financiers can take collateral, but they differ in enforcement and coordination efficiency at default. The single primitive wedge—a...
Mark Izgarshev et Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1675, octobre 2025
A benevolent advisor observes a project’s complexity and posts a pass–fail threshold before the agent chooses effort. The project suc-ceeds only if ability and effort together clear complexity. We com-pare two informational regimes. In the naive regime, the threshold is treated as non-informative;...
Pierre Dubois
n° 25-1674, octobre 2025, révision décembre 2025
We examine pharmaceutical regulations and incentives for innovation from an international perspective, highlighting the public good nature of healthcare innovation and its cross-border diffusion. We summarize the empirical evidence on how push and pull incentives shape R&D investment,...
Patrick Fève et Alban Moura
n° 25-1673, octobre 2025
We propose to measure business cycles using vector autoregressions (VARs). Our method builds on two insights: VARs automatically decompose the data into stable and unstable components, and variance-based shock identfication can extract meaningful cycles from the stable part. This method has...
Shota Ichihashi et Alex Smolin
n° 25-1672, octobre 2025
In markets where algorithmic data processing is increasingly prevalent, recom-mendation algorithms can substantially affect trade and welfare. We consider a setting in which an algorithm recommends a product based on its value to the buyer and its price. We characterize an algorithm that maximizes...
Alex Smolin et Takuro Yamashita
n° 25-1671, octobre 2025
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of ac-tions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in a principal-agent contracting problem. Building on this...
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti et Alex Smolin
n° 25-1670, octobre 2025, révision mars 2026
We develop a framework for the optimal pricing and product design of LLMs in which a provider sells menus of token budgets to users who differ in their valuations across a continuum of tasks. Under a homogeneous production technology, we show that users’ high-dimensional type profiles are...
vol. 153, octobre 2025, révision 10 juin 2026, p. 131–144
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's...
Andreea Enache et Andrew Rhodes
vol. 256, n° 112635, octobre 2025, révision 10 juin 2026
Many platforms use Price Parity Clauses (PPCs) to prevent sellers charging lower prices elsewhere. In a setting where PPCs affect platforms’ data acquisition, we show that buyers and sellers may benefit from PPCs when the market is young.
Jeffrey A. Friedman
octobre 2025
This article analyzes more than 60,000 assessments of uncertainty made by national security officials from more than forty NATO allies and partners. The findings show that national security officials are overwhelmingly overconfident and that their judgments are especially prone to false positives....
