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Adrien Blanchet et Jérôme Bolte
n° 17-787, mars 2017
For displacement convex functionals in the probability space equipped with the Monge-Kantorovich metric we prove the equivalence between the gradient and functional type Lojasiewicz inequalities. In a second part, we specialise these inequalities to some classical geodesically convex functionals....
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié
n° 17-788, mars 2017, révision janvier 2021
This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We rst provide a general necessary and sucient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprotable. We then use this result to characterize, for an active market, a unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by a market...
Michel Le Breton et Karine Van Der Straeten
n° 17-789, mars 2017, révision juin 2017
L’objet de cet article est d’offrir une présentation synthétique des principaux travaux théoriques et empiriques portant sur la formation des coalitions électorales et gouvernementales et utilisant comme socle méthodologique la théorie des jeux coopératifs avec ou sans utilité transférable.
Johannes Hörner et Stefano Lovo
n° 17-790, mars 2017
We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for trading with potentially informed retail traders. For a class of market microstructure models, we characterize equilibria in which dealers’ dynamic pricing strategies are optimal no matter...
Alessandro Bonatti et Johannes Hörner
n° 17-791, mars 2017
We analyze strategic experimentation in which information arrives through fully revealing, publicly observable “breakdowns.” When actions are hidden, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium that involves randomization over stopping times. With two players, this is the unique equilibrium....
Johannes Hörner et Satoru Takahashi
n° 17-792, mars 2017
n° 17-793, mars 2017
This paper analyzes the impact of market structure on career concerns. Effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. For any wage, the agent works too little, too late. Under short-term contracts,...
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci
vol. 65, n° 1, mars 2017, p. 105–135
We study the case in which a library consortium increases the aggregate payoff of the member libraries. We find that libraries with similar preferences are likely to lose from building a consortium and that those with diverse preferences are likely to gain by doing so. Combining libraries with...
Philippe Gagnepain et Marc Ivaldi
vol. 65, n° 1, mars 2017, p. 1–38
We consider contrac ts f or public transport services between a p ublicauthority and a transport operator. We b ui ld a struct ural endo gen ousswitching model w her e the contract choice re su lts from the combinedef fect s of the incentiviza tion scheme aimed a t monitoring the opera tor?sef fic...
Jean-Paul Azam et Kartika Bhatia
vol. 170, n° 3, mars 2017, p. 183–210
This paper presents a model of provocation in a federation, where the local government triggers an insurgency with a view to acquire the control of some economic assets with the help of the central government. Some econometric support for this model is found using data on the Naxalite conflict that...
