Recherche avancée

Sébastien Pouget, Daniel Brodback, Nadja Guenster et Ruichen Wang

n° 2025-1683, octobre 2025, 75 pages

We present an experimental study of investors’ willingness to pay for socially responsible assets. In our initial public offering experiment, various assets share identical financial risk-return profiles but differ in the intensity and timing of societal benefits, represented by charitable...

Document de travail

Anouch Missirian, Frederik Noack, Dennis Engist, Josephine Gantois, Vasundhara Gaur, Batoule F. Hyjazie, Ashley Larsen, Leithen K. M’Gonigle, Matin Qaim, Risa D. Sargent, Eduardo Souza-Rodrigues et Claire Kremen

n° 25-1684, octobre 2025, 22 pages

Genetically modified (GM) crops have been adopted by some of the world’s leading agricultural nations, but the full extent of their environmental impacts remains largely unknown. While concerns about the direct environmental effects of GM crops have declined, GM crops have led to indirect changes...

Document de travail

Sébastien Pouget, Daniel Brodback, Nadja Guenster et Ruichen Wang

octobre 2025, révision 10 juin 2026, 17 pages

We present an experimental study of investors’ willingness to pay for socially responsible assets. In our initial public offering experiment, various assets share identical financial risk-return profiles but differ in the intensity and timing of societal benefits, represented by charitable...

Article

Georgy Lukyanov et Emin Ablyatifov

n° 25-1682, octobre 2025

We embed honesty-based reputation into a Ramsey taxation framework with com-petitive firms and households. In a static benchmark with exogenous trust, there is a sharp cutoff below which the optimal policy sets no taxes and above which the optimal tax take rises with trust. In the dynamic model,...

Document de travail

Darina Cheredina et Georgy Lukyanov

n° 25-1681, octobre 2025

We study sequential social learning when agents can sometimes pay to verify a claim and obtain hard, publicly checkable evidence. Each agent observes the public history, receives a private signal, may investigate at a cost (succeeding only when the claim is true), and can disclose or conceal any...

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Georgy Lukyanov, Konstantin Shamruk et Ekaterina Logina

n° 25-1680, octobre 2025

We study a dynamic reputation model with a fixed posted price where only pur-chases are public. A long-lived seller chooses costly quality; each buyer observes the purchase history and a private signal. Under a Markov selection, beliefs split into two cascades—where actions are unresponsive and...

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Vasilii Ivanik et Georgy Lukyanov

n° 25-1679, octobre 2025

We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors’ actions, decides whether to acquire a private signal (and how precise it should be), and then chooses between two actions. Payoffs value...

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Bence Bago, Philippe Muller et Jean-François Bonnefon

n° 25-1678, octobre 2025

Document de travail

Bence Bago, Philippe Muller et Jean-François Bonnefon

octobre 2025, révision 10 juin 2026

Climate scepticism remains an important barrier to public engagement with accurate climate information, because sceptics often actively avoid information that contains climate science facts. There still lacks a scalable, repeatable intervention to boost sceptics’ engagement with climate information...

Article

Georgy Lukyanov et Anna Vlasova

n° 25-1677, octobre 2025

We study dynamic delegation with reputation feedback: a long-lived expert advises a sequence of implementers whose effort responds to current reputation, altering outcome informativeness and belief updates. We solve for a recursive, belief-based equilibrium and show that advice is a reputation-...

Document de travail