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Randolph Tritell, Daniel Crane et Damien Gerard (éds.)
novembre 2024, 870 pages
Manh-Hung Nguyen, Viet-Ngu Hoang, Son Nghiem et Lan Anh Nguyen
n° 24-1598, novembre 2024
Mandatory vaccination for COVID-19 has received intense political and ethical debates, while the literature on the causal effects of vaccination mandates on vaccination outcomes is very limited. In this study, we examine the effects of the announcement of vaccine mandates (VMs) for workers working...
Elena Panova
n° 24-1597, novembre 2024, révision 10 mars 2025
This paper extends the reputational cheap-talk model to study the effect of media market structure on the quality of news, depending on news coverage characterized by: (i) the precision of common priors and (ii) the likelihood of follow-up quality assessment. We find that competition (weakly)...
Tuuli Vanhapelto et Thierry Magnac
n° 24-1596, novembre 2024
Local housing markets differ in their liquidity, the ease of transacting. Transacting is often easier in urban rather than rural locations, for example. To rationalize these liq-uidity differences, we set up a model of housing search in the cross-section of multiple interconnected local markets....
Philippe De Donder, David Bardey et Marie-Louise Leroux
n° 24-1595, novembre 2024
We study a situation where physicians differing in their degree of altruism exert a diagnostic effort before deciding whether to test patients to determine the most appropriate treatment. The diagnostic effort generates an imperfect private signal of the patient’s type, while the test is perfect....
Jacques Crémer et Claude D'Aspremont
n° 24-1593, novembre 2024
The theory of Bayesian mechanism design is of interest to economists and computer scientists alike. It has focused on two extreme assumptions on the beliefs of the agents, full-freeness (or independence) and no-freeness (or Beliefs Determine Preferences). We discuss more general conditions that...
Christian Hellwig et Venky Venkateswaran
n° 24-1594, novembre 2024, révision mai 2025
We study the propagation of nominal shocks in a dispersed information economy where firms learn from and respond to information generated by their activities in product and factor markets. We show that imperfect information on its own has no effect on equilibrium outcomes, when firms have the...
Patrick Fève et Alban Moura
vol. 168, n° 105000, novembre 2024
This paper establishes that frictionless, rational-expectations models driven by specific ARMA(2,1) processes can produce equilibrium asset-price momentum, defined as persistent movements in asset-price changes. To demonstrate this, we first document that AR(2) models adequately capture the...
David Martimort et Lars Stole
n° 24-1592, novembre 2024
We study menu auction games in which several principals influence the choice of a privately-informed agent by simultaneously offering action-contingent payments; the agent is free to accept any subset of the offers. Building on tools from non-smooth optimal control with type-dependent participation...
Doh-Shin Jeon, Shota Ichihashi et Byung-Cheol Kim
n° 24-1591, novembre 2024
We study a mechanism design problem of a monopoly platform that matches content of varying quality, ads with dierent ad revenues, and consumers with heterogeneous tastes for content quality. The optimal mechanism balances revenue from advertising and revenue from selling access to content:...
