Article

Information disclosure in preemption races: Blessing or (winner's) curse?

Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Lévy et Thomas Mariotti

Résumé

Firms receiving independent signals on a common-value risky project compete to be the first to invest. When firms are symmetric and competition is winner-take-all, rents are fully dissipated in equilibrium and the extent to which signals are publicly disclosed is irrelevant for welfare. When disclosure of signals is asymmetric, welfare is highest when firms are most asymmetric, and policies that uniformly promote disclosure may backfire, especially when competition is severe. When firms strategically select their disclosure policies, a moderate subsidy for disclosure induces a low correlation between firms' policies, and thus maximizes welfare.

Remplace

Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Lévy et Thomas Mariotti, « Information disclosure in preemption races:Blessing or (winner's) curse? », TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1202, avril 2021, révision février 2025.

Référence

Catherine Bobtcheff, Raphaël Lévy et Thomas Mariotti, « Information disclosure in preemption races: Blessing or (winner's) curse? », The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 56, n° 2, mai 2025, p. 145–162.

Publié dans

The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 56, n° 2, mai 2025, p. 145–162