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Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon et Jean-Paul Décamps
vol. 11, n° 2, mai 2019, p. 98–130
We study capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading, thereby facing an externality if firms raise funds from multiple sources. We analyze whether investors’ ability to design financial covenants that may include exclusivity clauses mitigates this externality...
Jay Pil Choi, Doh-Shin Jeon et Byung-Cheol Kim
vol. 173, mai 2019, p. 113–124
We provide a theoretical model of privacy in which data collection requires consumers’ consent and consumers are fully aware of the consequences of such consent. Nonetheless, excessive collection of personal information arises in the monopoly market equilibrium which results in excessive loss of...
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci
vol. 115, mai 2019, p. 265–288
We study how the formation of a buyer group affects buyer power when sellers compete and buyers operate in separate markets. Previous research (Inderst and Shaffer, 2007, and Dana, 2012) has considered a buyer group that can commit to an exclusive purchase and has found that the formation of a...
Maxime Derex, Jean-François Bonnefon, Robert Boyd et Alex Mesoudi
vol. 3, mai 2019, p. 446–452
Bows and arrows, houses and kayaks are just a few examples of the highly optimized tools that humans have produced and used to colonize new environments1,2. Because there is much evidence that humans’ cognitive abilities are unparalleled3,4, many believe that such technologies resulted from our...
Nicolas Astier et Xavier Lambin
vol. 40, n° 3, mai 2019
This paper studies wholesale electricity markets where an exogenous price cap is enforced, compromising both short- and long-term incentives. To guarantee capacity adequacy, policy-makers may provide support for generation through a capacity remuneration mechanism (CRM) and/or encourage demand...
Alex Smolin et Gleb Romanyuk
vol. 11, n° 2, mai 2019, p. 250–276
Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and sequentially decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information...
Marcel Boyer
mai 2019
Christine Webb, Alice Baniel, Guy Cowlishaw et Elise Huchard
vol. 151, mai 2019, p. 145–155
Theodora Fuss, Sabine Noebel et Klaudia Witte
vol. 94, n° 5, mai 2019, p. 759–771, 13 pages
The social environment offers fish complex information about the quality, performance, personality and other cues of potential mates and competitors simultaneously. It is likely, therefore, that the environmental information regarding the context of mate choice is perceived and processed...
Alejandrina Cristia, Emmanuel Dupoux, Michael Gurven et Jonathan Stieglitz
vol. 90, n° 3, mai 2019, p. 759–773
