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Takuro Yamashita et Alex Smolin
juillet 2022, révision 10 juin 2026, p. 870
We study information design in games with a continuum of actions such that the payoff of each player is concave in his action. A designer chooses an information structure--a joint distribution of a state and a private signal of each player. The information structure induces a Bayesian game and is...
Koen Jochmans
vol. 117, n° 538, juillet 2022, p. 887–896
We consider inference in linear regression models that is robust to heteroskedasticity and the presence of many control variables. When the number of control variables increases at the same rate as the sample size the usual heteroskedasticity-robust estimators of the covariance matrix are...
Johannes Hörner, Nicolas Klein et Sven Rady
vol. 89, n° 4, juillet 2022, p. 1948–1992
This article considers a class of experimentation games with Lévy bandits encompassing those of Bolton and Harris (1999, Econometrica, 67, 349–374) and Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005, Econometrica, 73, 39–68). Its main result is that efficient (perfect Bayesian) equilibria exist whenever players’...
Elena Panova
n° 22-1356, juillet 2022, révision mars 2023
We consider the problem of sharing the cost of a fixed tree-network among users with differentiated willingness to pay for the good supplied through the network. We find that the associated value-sharing problem is convex, hence, the core is large and we axiomatize a new, computationally simple...
Jeffrey A. Friedman
vol. 98, n° 4, 5 juillet 2022, p. 1289–1305
International Relations scholars frequently warn that the American political system has become too fractured to sustain a coherent grand strategy. This perception generally rests on two premises: that President Donald Trump led an unprecedented assault on established principles of US foreign policy...
Frédéric Koessler, Marie Laclau, Jérôme Renault et Tristan Tomala
n° 22-1341, juin 2022
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further information...
Manon Costa, Sébastien Gadat et Lorick Huang
n° 22-1342, juin 2022, révision novembre 2023
This article studies and solves the problem of optimal portfolio allocation with CV@R penalty when dealing with imperfectly simulated financial assets. We use a Stochastic biased Mirror Descent to find optimal resource allocation for a portfolio whose underlying assets cannot be generated exactly and...
Henrik Paul Lopuhaä, Valérie Gares et Anne Ruiz-Gazen
n° 22-1343, juin 2022
We provide a unified approach to S-estimation in balanced linear models with structured covariance matrices. Of main interest are S-estimators for linear mixed effects models, but our approach also includes S-estimators in several other standard multivariate models, such as multiple regression,...
Estelle Medous, Camelia Goga, Anne Ruiz-Gazen, Jean-François Beaumont, Alain Dessertaine et Pauline Puech
n° 22-1344, juin 2022
n this paper, we investigate how a big non-probability database can be used to improve estimates from a small probability sample through data integration techniques. In the situation where the study variable is observed in both data sources, Kim and Tam (2021) proposed two design-consistent...
Marc Ivaldi, Emile Quinet et Celia Ruiz Mejia
n° 22-1385, juin 2022
The objective of this paper is to estimate the extent of agglomeration externalities taking into account the direct and indirect impacts of transport exposure on productivity. To do so, we take advantage of a rich data infrastructure that combines very fine georeferenced infra-municipality data on...
