Jump to navigation
Carola Binder
16 mars 2021, 16h00–17h00, BDF, Paris
Arnaud Maurel (Duke University)
TSE, 16 mars 2021, 15h30–16h50, Zoom
We propose a new method to estimate continuous-time job search models. Our approach is based on an adaptation of the conditional choice probability estimation methods to a continuous-time job search environment. To do so, the proposed framework incorporates preference shocks into the search...
Elena Argentesi (University of Bologna)
TSE, 15 mars 2021, 14h00–15h30, salle Zoom
We empirically investigate the impact of multi-homing in two-sided markets. First, we build a micro-founded structural econometric model, which encompasses demand for differentiated products and allows for multi-homing on both sides of the market. We then use an original dataset on the Italian...
Milo Bianchi (Toulouse School of Economics)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 mars 2021, 12h30–13h30, salle Online
We study the effects of robo-advising on investors' attention, trading, and performance on a large set of Employees Saving Plans covering a representative sample of French employees. We find that relative to self-managing, accessing the robo services is associated to an increase in the time...
Julie Subervie (INRAE;Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement de Montpellier)
Toulouse : TSE, 15 mars 2021, 11h00–12h15, Zoom
In many African countries, rural households typically sell their crops immediately after the harvest, and then face severe food shortages during the lean season. This paper explores whether alleviating both credit and storage constraints through an inventory credit (orwarrantage) program in Burkina...
Jeffrey Franks
Toulouse : TSE, 11 mars 2021, 17h00–18h00, salle Online
France has been one the European countries most affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and has consequently faced one the largest economic shocks. The webinar will present the latest views of the IMF on the crisis, the French authorities’ response, and policies needed to create a more inclusive, green...
Alessandra Casella (Columbia University)
11 mars 2021, 15h30–17h00, Zoom
Mechanism design teaches us that a mediator can strictly improve the chances of peace between two opponents even when the mediator has no independent resources, is less informed than the two parties, and has no enforcement power. We test the theory in a lab experiment where two subjects negotiate...
Panayotis Mertikopoulos ( CNRS;Institut Montpelliérain Alexander Grothendieck (IMAG) - Université de Montpellier)
Toulouse : TSE, 11 mars 2021, 11h00–12h15, Zoom
This talk aims to survey the triple-point interface between optimization, game theory, and dynamical systems. We will begin by discussing how the ordinary differential equation (ODE) method of stochastic approximation can be used to analyze the trajectories of a wide array of stochastic first-order...
Online, 10 mars 2021
Federico Bugni (Duke University)
TSE, 9 mars 2021, 15h30–16h50, Zoom
The literature on dynamic discrete games often assumes that the conditional choice probabilities and the state transition probabilities are homogeneous across markets and over time. We refer to this as the \homogeneity assumption" in dynamic discrete games. This homogeneity assumption enables...
