Yaohui DONG soutiendra sa thèse de doctorat en Sciences économiques le mardi 11 septembre 2018 à 15h00 sur le sujet « Essays in Health Economics »
Salle MQ 212 (Manufacture des Tabacs)
- Directeur de thèse : Helmuth CREMER, Professeur, Toulouse School of Economics
- Co-directrice : Catarina GOULAO, Professeure, Toulouse School of Economics
Le jury est composé de :
- Professeure Francesca BARIGOZZI, Université de Bologne
- Professeur Cheng HUANG, Institut de Technologie SHENZHEN
- Professeur Emmanuel THIBAULT, Université de Perpignan
- Professeur Jean-Marie LOZACHMEUR, TSE
- Professeur Helmuth CREMER, TSE
- Professeure Catarina GOULAO, TSE
Résumé (en anglais) :
This thesis investigates several topics in health economics, and each of the three chapters is a self-contained paper. It aims to contribute to the design of health care systems and provides suggestions to policy makers.
The first two chapters comes from my job market paper entitled "Reference De- pendent Decisions on Non-communicable Diseases: Prevention, Treatment and Optimal Health Insurance". In Chapter 1, I develop a reference dependent theory that accounts for people’s decisions on their prevention and treatment of non-communicable diseases. Patients are predicted to have the same willingness to pay for the treatment of NCDs, and to go bankrupt if the willingness to pay exceeds their in- come. It imposes more realistic assumptions of health decisions, and the reference dependent theory better fits people’s decision patterns regarding NCDs. It also leads to different policy implications regarding the design of social insurance.
Chapter 2 is the application of the theory in the design of social health insurance. It investigates how individuals with reference dependent preferences respond to various forms of social insurance. It shows that health insurance with copays can either encourage or discourage prevention, even when the efforts are not observable to the insurance provider. Moreover, deductible insurance is found to be financially unfeasible with ex-post moral hazard. The chapter then derives the analytical re- sults of optimal social health insurance with the presence of ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard. The inverse relationship between income and prevention serves as a justification of redistribution.
The third chapter, co-authored with Catarina Goulão, studies the impact of patient mobility on different health care systems that compete using waiting time and price respectively. We use a Hotelling model with two regions with different types of public health care systems to study the impact of patient mobility on their interac- tion, and on the regional welfare. We first characterize the autarky scenarios where patient mobility is no allowed, and shows that price and waiting time have different welfare impacts on regional welfare. We then explore equilibrium price and waiting time if patient mobility is allowed, and compare with the autarky scenario, and discuss the possible impacts on regional welfare.