Séminaire

Prescription of generics and physician moral hazard: evidence from France

Laura Lasio (Toulouse School of Economics)

15 avril 2013, 12h30–13h30

Salle MS 003

Applied Micro Workshop

Résumé

This work investigates how physician, patient and drug characteristics interact in the prescription decision between brand-name and generic drugs. It aims at verifying whether non-medical factors affect the outcome of the prescription process and whether physicians adjust the choice of the brand version to patient preferences and characteristics, a form of moral hazard à la Pauly (1968). The analysis uses CEGEDIM data on a representative sample of 327 French General Practitioners and 10627 patients, receiving prescriptions between 2000 and 2008 for drugs in five therapeutic classes (anti-ulcer, anti-diabetes, anti-hypertensive, anti-cholesterol and antidepressant drugs). Results suggest that physician and patient characteristics play a major role in explaining the decision on the brand type: patients that are fully reimbursed show a higher probability of receiving a brand-name prescription. Regulation matters as well: the introduction of reference pricing on some drugs is estimated to increase signifcantly the probability of generic prescription.