Résumé
A model of entrepreneurial choices in an economy with a corrupt public procurement sector is built, providing predictions along two main dimensions. First, corruption is more frequent in sectors where public institutions are large buyers. Second, firms favoured with corrupt contracts enjoy extra returns, so that procurement related activities attract the best entrepreneurs. A large scale microeconomic database, including all public procurement operations over a 4 year period in Paraguay, amounting annually to approximately 6% of the country’s GDP, is then used to corroborate these predictions.
Mots-clés
Procurement; Corruption; Rent-seeking; Development;
Codes JEL
- H57: Procurement
- D73: Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption
- D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- O5: Economywide Country Studies
Remplacé par
Emmanuelle Auriol, Thomas Flochel et Stéphane Straub, « Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay », World Development, vol. 77, janvier 2016, p. 395–407.
Référence
Emmanuelle Auriol, Thomas Flochel et Stéphane Straub, « Public Procurement and Rent-Seeking: The Case of Paraguay », TSE Working Paper, n° 11-224, 18 février 2011, révision mars 2015.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
TSE Working Paper, n° 11-224, 18 février 2011, révision mars 2015