Document de travail

Platform Liability and Innovation

Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili et Leonardo Madio

Résumé

We study a platform’s incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers on the platform, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure that innovative products face from IP-infringing products. However, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which can overturn this intended effect on innovation. Moreover, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers as platform liability reduces consumer surplus for a given number of innovators. We also analyze how different types of cross-group network effects affect the impact of platform liability on innovation and consumer welfare.

Mots-clés

Platform, Liability, Intellectual Property, Innovation.;

Codes JEL

  • K40: General
  • K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
  • K13: Tort Law and Product Liability • Forensic Economics
  • L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L86: Information and Internet Services • Computer Software

Référence

Doh-Shin Jeon, Yassine Lefouili et Leonardo Madio, « Platform Liability and Innovation », TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1361, septembre 2022.

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 22-1361, septembre 2022