Document de travail

A Note on Lobbying a Legislature

Vera Zaporozhets


We study a simple in?uence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary offers to one or more members. We compute the minimum budget needed for the lobby to pass the bill and the distribution of this budget between the legislators. We also show the connection of the problem to the combinatorial optimization.


Legislative lobbying; Combinatorial optimization; Knapsack problem;

Codes JEL

  • C61: Optimization Techniques • Programming Models • Dynamic Analysis
  • D71: Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
  • D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior


Vera Zaporozhets, « A Note on Lobbying a Legislature », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-673, juillet 2016.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 16-673, juillet 2016