Document de travail

Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection

Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié


This article surveys recent attempts at characterizing competitive allocations under adverse selection when each informed agent can privately trade with several uninformed parties: that is, trade is nonexclusive. We rst show that requiring market outcomes to be robust to entry selects a unique candidate allocation, which involves cross-subsidies. We then study how to implement this allocation as the equilibrium outcome of a game in which the uninformed parties, acting as principals, compete by making oers to the informed agents. We show that equilibria typically fail to exist in competitive- screening games, in which these oers are simultaneous. We nally explore alternative extensive forms, and show that the candidate allocation can be implemented through a discriminatory ascending auction. These results yield sharp predictions for competitive nonexclusive markets.


Adverse Selection; Entry-Proofness; Discriminatory Pricing; Nonexclusive; Markets; Ascending Auctions;

Codes JEL

  • D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
  • D86: Economics of Contract: Theory


Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié, « Competitive Nonlinear Pricing under Adverse Selection », TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1201, avril 2021.

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Publié dans

TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1201, avril 2021