Résumé
The phenomenon of grandparents assuming the role of caretakers for their grandchildren is substantial and on the rise; a trend partially attributed to mothers’ increased participation in the workforce. While altruism is commonly assumed to be the primary driver behind such caregiving, we examine an additional motivation: the expectation among grandparents that they will receive care from their offspring in the event of their own incapacity. This study investigates this hypothesis from theoretical and empirical perspectives. Initially, we construct a theoretical framework, delineating a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium model wherein the grandparent first commits to caring for the grandchild, followed by anticipation of receiving care from their adult child in disability scenarios. Subsequently, we empirically test the feasibility of this model by analysing data sourced from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe. Our results confirm that elderly parents who cared for their grandchildren received more support from their children in the case of a loss of autonomy.
Mots-clés
Long-term care; Intergenerational transfers; Informal care;
Codes JEL
- D13: Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
- J14: Economics of the Elderly • Economics of the Handicapped • Non-Labor Market Discrimination
- D64: Altruism • Philanthropy
Référence
Mathieu Lefebvre, Pierre Pestieau et Jérôme Schoenmaeckers, « Grandchild care and eldercare. A quid pro quo arrangement », Economic Modelling, vol. 146, mai 2025, 13 pages.
Publié dans
Economic Modelling, vol. 146, mai 2025, 13 pages
