5 février 2025, 14h00–15h00
Zoom
Economics of Platforms Seminar
Résumé
We study how privacy regulation affects menu pricing by a monopolist platform that collects and monetizes personal data. Consumers differ in privacy valuation and sophistication: naive users ignore privacy losses, while sophisticated users internalize them. The platform designs prices and data collection options to screen users. Without regulation, privacy allocations are distorted and naive users are exploited. Regulation through privacy-protecting defaults can create a market for information by inducing payments for data; hard caps on data collection protect naive users but may restrict efficient data trade.
Mots-clés
Data,; Defaults; Digital Platforms; Menu Pricing; Privacy, Regulation;
Codes JEL
- D18: Consumer Protection
- D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
- D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief
- L12: Monopoly • Monopolization Strategies
- L51: Economics of Regulation