Résumé
Does enhanced access to data foster or hinder competition among firms? Using a competition-in-utility framework that encompasses many situations where firms use data, we model data as a revenue-shifter and identify two opposite effects: a mark-up effect according to which data induces firms to compete harder, and a surplus-extraction effect. We provide conditions for data to be pro- or anti-competitive, requiring neither knowledge of demand nor computation of equilibrium. We apply our results to situations where data is used to recommend products, monitor insuree behavior, price-discriminate, or target advertising. We also revisit the issue of data and market structure.
Mots-clés
Competition, data, price discrimination, targeted advertising, market structure;
Codes JEL
- L1: Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L4: Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5: Regulation and Industrial Policy
Remplace
Alexandre de Cornière et Greg Taylor, « Data and Competition: A Simple Framework », TSE Working Paper, n° 23-1404, janvier 2023, révision août 2024.
Référence
Alexandre de Cornière et Greg Taylor, « Data and Competition: A Simple Framework », The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 56, n° 4, novembre 2025, p. 494–510.
Publié dans
The RAND Journal of Economics, vol. 56, n° 4, novembre 2025, p. 494–510