Does universalization ethics justify participation in large elections?

Résumé

We analyze the turnout decisions of ethical voters, equipped with (semi-)Kantian preferences: a voter considers the election outcome that would arise if other voters behaved like him. The “others” can be limited to co-partisans (“partisan ethics”) or not (“non-partisan ethics”). In a standard model with two candidates, a known underdog, a continuum of voters, and a continuous power-sharing rule, we introduce two novel elements: core constituent groups, and distinct election stakes for the two partisan groups. Under partisan ethics, when an equilibrium exists, turnout is positive for both sides if the election is not of the winner-take-all kind. Under non-partisan ethics an equilibrium always exists and turnout is positive for one side only. There sometimes exist equilibria where the underdog wins. Moreover, multiple equilibria sometimes arise, possibly with different winners. Voters further face a coordination problem under equilibrium multiplicity in the non-partisan case.