Résumé
Consider a firm owned by shareholders with heterogeneous beliefs and discount rates who delegate to a manager the choice of a production plan. The shareholders and the manager can trade contingent claims in a complete asset market. Shareholders cannot observe the chosen production plan and design a compensation scheme so that at equilibrium the manager chooses the plan they prefer and reveals it truthfully. We show that at equilibrium i) profit is maximized, ii) the manager gets a constant share of production, iii) she has no incentive to trade. We then show that such equilibrium exists if and only if the manager has the same belief and discount rate as the representative shareholder. This allows us to characterize the required characteristics of the manager as a function of shareholders' characteristics.
Mots-clés
heterogeneous shareholders, asymmetric information, manager-shareholders equilibrium;
Codes JEL
- G32: Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • Goodwill
- G34: Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate Governance
- D24: Production • Cost • Capital • Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity
- D51: Exchange and Production Economies
- D53: Financial Markets
- D70: General
Remplace
Milo Bianchi, Rose-Anne Dana et Elyès Jouini, « Shareholder Heterogeneity, Asymmetric Information, and the Equilibrium Manager », TSE Working Paper, n° 21-1181, janvier 2021.
Référence
Milo Bianchi, Rose-Anne Dana et Elyès Jouini, « Shareholder Heterogeneity, Asymmetric Information, and the Equilibrium Manager », Economic Theory, vol. 73, n° 4, 2022, p. 1101–1134.
Voir aussi
Publié dans
Economic Theory, vol. 73, n° 4, 2022, p. 1101–1134