In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.
- C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- Q28: Government Policy
- Q38: Government Policy
Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller, Arnaud Reynaud et Carine Sebi, « Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation », TSE Working Paper, n° 09-100, 23 octobre 2009.
Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller, Arnaud Reynaud et Carine Sebi, « Regulatory instruments to protect the commons: An experimental investigation », Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 58, n° 2, juin 2014, p. 219–244.
Environmental and Resource Economics, vol. 58, n° 2, juin 2014, p. 219–244