Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations

Takuro Yamashita et Fumitoshi Moriya


Organizations may suffer from unforeseen negative shocks, potentially leading to severe bottlenecks. This paper studies an optimal incentive scheme robust to those shocks in the effort induction problem in team production. The optimal scheme under the no-shock assumption is typically vulnerable in that a single shock can lead to shirking of sizable non-shocked members. We show that an optimal scheme is associated with a uniform order of worker subsets; and identify relative complementarity as a novel source of the determinant of the optimal organization structure.

Codes JEL

  • D23: Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights
  • L23: Organization of Production
  • M54: Labor Management


Takuro Yamashita et Fumitoshi Moriya, « Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations », AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 112, mai 2022, p. 444–451.

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Publié dans

AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 112, mai 2022, p. 444–451