Article

Intergroup Conflict with Intragroup Altruism

Wei Hu et Nicolas Treich

Résumé

In this paper, we consider an intergroup contest game with intragroup altruism. We show that more altruism within a group increases conflict intensity by increasing total groups' efforts. Moreover, we show that, unlike the celebrated Olson's group size paradox, group size increases the probability of winning the contest provided that intragroup altruism is high enough.

Référence

Wei Hu et Nicolas Treich, « Intergroup Conflict with Intragroup Altruism », Economics Bulletin, vol. 38, n° 2, avril 2018, p. 720–724.

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Publié dans

Economics Bulletin, vol. 38, n° 2, avril 2018, p. 720–724