Résumé
We study mix-and-match compatibility choices of firms selling complementary products in a dynamic setting. Contrary to what happens in a static setting where symmetric firms choose compatibility (Matutes and Regibeau 1988), when switching costs are high and firms make price discrimination based on past purchases, symmetric firms choose incompatibility to soften future competition if the discount factor is large, which harms consumers. Interoperability increases consumer surplus at least for high switching costs. Data portability, by reducing switching costs, induces the firms to choose compatibility more often but, given a compatibility regime, benefits consumers only if a nonnegative pricing constraint binds.
Codes JEL
- D43: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41: Monopolization • Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Remplace
Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci et Nikrooz Nasr, « Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability: On the Role of the Non-Negative Pricing Constraint », TSE Working Paper, n° 16-691, septembre 2016, révision août 2020.
Référence
Doh-Shin Jeon, Domenico Menicucci et Nikrooz Nasr, « Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs and Data Portability », American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 15, n° 1, février 2023, p. 30–73.
Publié dans
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol. 15, n° 1, février 2023, p. 30–73