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Sébastien Pouget, Daniel Brodback, Nadja Guenster et Ruichen Wang
octobre 2025, 17 pages
We present an experimental study of investors’ willingness to pay for socially responsible assets. In our initial public offering experiment, various assets share identical financial risk-return profiles but differ in the intensity and timing of societal benefits, represented by charitable...
Georgy Lukyanov et Emin Ablyatifov
n° 25-1682, octobre 2025
We embed honesty-based reputation into a Ramsey taxation framework with com-petitive firms and households. In a static benchmark with exogenous trust, there is a sharp cutoff below which the optimal policy sets no taxes and above which the optimal tax take rises with trust. In the dynamic model,...
Darina Cheredina et Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1681, octobre 2025
We study sequential social learning when agents can sometimes pay to verify a claim and obtain hard, publicly checkable evidence. Each agent observes the public history, receives a private signal, may investigate at a cost (succeeding only when the claim is true), and can disclose or conceal any...
Georgy Lukyanov, Konstantin Shamruk et Ekaterina Logina
n° 25-1680, octobre 2025
We study a dynamic reputation model with a fixed posted price where only pur-chases are public. A long-lived seller chooses costly quality; each buyer observes the purchase history and a private signal. Under a Markov selection, beliefs split into two cascades—where actions are unresponsive and...
Vasilii Ivanik et Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1679, octobre 2025
We study sequential social learning with endogenous information acquisition when agents have a taste for nonconformity. Each agent observes predecessors’ actions, decides whether to acquire a private signal (and how precise it should be), and then chooses between two actions. Payoffs value...
Bence Bago, Philippe Muller et Jean-François Bonnefon
n° 25-1678, octobre 2025
octobre 2025
Climate scepticism remains an important barrier to public engagement with accurate climate information, because sceptics often actively avoid information that contains climate science facts. There still lacks a scalable, repeatable intervention to boost sceptics’ engagement with climate information...
Georgy Lukyanov et Anna Vlasova
n° 25-1677, octobre 2025
We study dynamic delegation with reputation feedback: a long-lived expert advises a sequence of implementers whose effort responds to current reputation, altering outcome informativeness and belief updates. We solve for a recursive, belief-based equilibrium and show that advice is a reputation-...
Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1676, octobre 2025
Firms often choose between concentrated, renegotiable bank claims and dispersed, arm’s-length market debt. I develop a tractable adverse-selection model in which both financiers can take collateral, but they differ in enforcement and coordination efficiency at default. The single primitive wedge—a...
Mark Izgarshev et Georgy Lukyanov
n° 25-1675, octobre 2025
A benevolent advisor observes a project’s complexity and posts a pass–fail threshold before the agent chooses effort. The project suc-ceeds only if ability and effort together clear complexity. We com-pare two informational regimes. In the naive regime, the threshold is treated as non-informative;...
