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Marina Kontalexi, Alexandros Gelastopoulos et Pantelis Analytis
mai 2025, p. 1086–1090
Theoretical work on sequential choice and large-scale experiments in online ranking and voting systems has demonstrated that social influence can have a drastic impact on social and technological systems. Yet, the effect of social influence on online rating systems remains understudied and the few...
Pascal Bégout et Jesus Ildefonso Diaz
vol. 53, mai 2025, p. 1–15
Dylan Hogan, Eyal G. Frank, Josephine Gantois et Anouch Missirian
vol. 115, mai 2025, p. 403–408
Global action to slow biodiversity loss is critically needed but comes at substantial cost. In this article, we assess the effectiveness of local ballot measures for land-based conservation projects in the United States as a way to increase bird abundance, a key conservation indicator. Using a...
Philippe De Donder
Toronto, vol. 58, n° 2, mai 2025, p. 414–417, Toronto
Emmanuelle Auriol, Nicolas Bonneton et Mattias Polborn
n° 25-1646, mai 2025
We present a moral hazard model of electoral accountability that challenges the common view of the populist vote as mere frustration with the elite. Rational voters use the threat of electing outsiders to incentivize more competent insiders whose policy preferences diverge from those of voters....
Andreea Enache et Andrew Rhodes
n° 25-1645, mai 2025
We consider a setting in which a platform matches buyers and sellers, who then wish to transact with each other multiple times. The platform charges fees for hosting transactions, but also offers convenience benefits. We consider two scenarios. In one scenario, all transactions must occur on the...
Jon Frost, Jean-Charles Rochet, Huyn Song Shin et Marianne Verdier
n° 25-1644, mai 2025
We compare three competing digital payment instruments: bank deposits, private stablecoins and central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). A simple theoretical model integrates the theory of two-sided markets and payment economics to assess the benefits of interoperability through a retail fast...
Bruno Biais, Jean-Charles Rochet et Stéphane Villeneuve
n° 25-1643, mai 2025
In our dynamic general equilibrium model, agents can invest in money and in a production technology exposed to shocks. If the government is non-benevolent and has a monopoly over money issuance it issues too much money, to finance excessive public expenditures. We study the effects of a...
Bruno Biais, Hans Gersbach, Jean-Charles Rochet, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden et Stéphane Villeneuve
n° 25-1642, mai 2025
We analyze dynamic capital allocation and risk sharing between a principal and many agents, who privately observe their output. The state variables of the mechanism design problem are aggregate capital and the distribution of continuation utilities across agents. This gives rise to a Bellman...
François Bachoc, Jérôme Bolte, Ryan Boustany et Jean-Michel Loubes
n° 25-1641, mai 2025
Despite growing empirical evidence of bias amplification in machine learning, its theoretical foundations remain poorly understood. We develop a formal framework for majority-minority learning tasks, showing how standard training can favor majority groups and produce stereotypical predictors that...
