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David Bardey, Philippe De Donder et Marie-Louise Leroux
n° 24-1595, novembre 2024, révision février 2026
We analyze a setting in which physicians, who differ in their degree of altruism, first exert diagnostic effort before deciding whether to administer a test to determine the most appropriate treatment. Diagnostic effort yields an imperfect private signal of the patient’s type, whereas the test...
Jacques Crémer et Claude D'Aspremont
n° 24-1593, novembre 2024
The theory of Bayesian mechanism design is of interest to economists and computer scientists alike. It has focused on two extreme assumptions on the beliefs of the agents, full-freeness (or independence) and no-freeness (or Beliefs Determine Preferences). We discuss more general conditions that...
Christian Hellwig et Venky Venkateswaran
n° 24-1594, novembre 2024, révision mai 2025
We study the propagation of nominal shocks in a dispersed information economy where firms learn from and respond to information generated by their activities in product and factor markets. We show that imperfect information on its own has no effect on equilibrium outcomes, when firms have the...
Patrick Fève et Alban Moura
vol. 168, n° 105000, novembre 2024
This paper establishes that frictionless, rational-expectations models driven by specific ARMA(2,1) processes can produce equilibrium asset-price momentum, defined as persistent movements in asset-price changes. To demonstrate this, we first document that AR(2) models adequately capture the...
David Martimort et Lars Stole
n° 24-1592, novembre 2024, révision septembre 2025
We study menu auction games in which several principals influence the choice of a privately-informed agent by simultaneously offering action-contingent payments; the agent is free to accept any subset of the offers. Building on tools from non-smooth optimal control with type-dependent participation...
Doh-Shin Jeon, Shota Ichihashi et Byung-Cheol Kim
n° 24-1591, novembre 2024, révision novembre 2025
We study a mechanism design problem of a monopoly platform that matches content of varying quality, ads with dierent ad revenues, and consumers with heterogeneous tastes for content quality. The optimal mechanism balances revenue from advertising and revenue from selling access to content:...
Jonathan Stieglitz
vol. 10, n° 45, novembre 2024
Human foragers avoid noncommunicable diseases that are leading causes of mortality, partly because physically active lifestyles promote healthy aging. High activity levels also promote tissue damage accumulation from wear-and-tear, increase risk of injury and disability which compromise...
Renato Gomes et Yassine Lefouili
n° 24-1590, novembre 2024
This paper explores the pricing of ancillary payment services by platforms and its implications for welfare. We distinguish between two types of platforms: vertical platforms that operate their own closed payment schemes, and stacked platforms that offer payment services through open schemes...
Boris Van Leeuwen et Ingela Alger
vol. 2, n° 4, novembre 2024
Theory suggests that a form of Kantian morality has evolutionary foundations. To investigate the relative importance of Kantian morality and social preferences, we run a laboratory experiment on strategic interaction in social dilemmas. We structurally estimate social preferences and Kantian...
Philippe Bontems, Guillaume Cheikbossian et Houda Hafidi
novembre 2024, révision 10 juin 2026
