Jump to navigation
Laurent Flochel, Bruno Versaevel et Étienne de Villemeur
n° 09-027, mars 2009, révision juillet 2011
Collusion sustainability depends on firms’ aptitude to impose sufficiently severe punishments in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We characterize the ability of oligopolistic firms to implement a collusive strategy when their ability to punish deviations over one or several periods is...
André Grimaud, Bertrand Magné et Luc Rougé
n° 09-023, mars 2009
We study how the availability of an abatement technology affects the optimal use of polluting exhaustible resources, and optimal climate policies. We develop a Romer endogenous growth model in which the accumulated stock of greenhouse gas emissions harms social welfare. Since the abatement...
Olivier Armantier et Nicolas Treich
n° 09-024, mars 2009
There is a debate about whether risk aversion is the main source of overbidding in a first-price independent private values auction. As an alternative, we adopt a non-expected utility framework, and identify an interpretable property on the probability weighting function which always induces...
Antoine Bommier, Marie-Louise Leroux et Jean-Marie Lozachmeur
n° 09-021, mars 2009
This paper studies the problem of redistribution between individuals having different mortality rates. We use a continuous time model in which there are two types of individuals characterized by different survival probability paths. Individual preferences are represented by a generalized life cycle...
Jean-Paul Azam, Robert H. Bates et Bruno Biais
n° 09-025, mars 2009
Bruno Biais, Peter Bossaerts et Chester Spatt
n° 09-018, mars 2009
Stéphane Straub
n° 09-029, mars 2009
Patrick Fève et Alain Guay
n° 09-028, mars 2009
Claude Crampes, Carole Haritchabalet et Bruno Jullien
vol. 57, n° 1, mars 2009, p. 7–31
David Martimort et Lars Stole
vol. 144, n° 2, mars 2009, p. 604–634
