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Christian Gollier et Jean Tirole
8 septembre 2009
Augustin Landier
6 septembre 2009
Marie-Françoise Calmette
3 septembre 2009
Roberta Dessi
n° 09-075, août 2009
Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci
n° 09-074, août 2009
In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon- Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous...
Oleg Shchetinin
n° 09-078, août 2009
I develop a model of reciprocal altruism which accounts for some evidence in contracting situations, which are paradoxical from the point of view of neoclassical contract theory with selfish actors. My model predicts the crowding-out effect, observed in the Trust Game with the possibility of a fine...
Jean-Paul Azam et Ruxanda Berlinschi
n° 09-077, août 2009
Jean-Pierre Florens, Jan Johannes et Sébastien Van Bellegem
n° 09-076, août 2009
David S. Bullock et Marion Desquilbet
vol. 91, n° 3, août 2009, p. 656–672
Patrick Fève et Alain Guay
vol. 41, n° 5, août 2009, p. 987–1013
