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Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Dario Maldonado et Pierre Pestieau
vol. 76, n° 1, juillet 2009, p. 86–98
Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder et Pierre Pestieau
30 juillet 2009
Sjaak Hurkens et Doh-Shin Jeon
n° 09-070, 28 juillet 2009
In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can apply termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, we find that a reduction of the termination...
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci
n° 09-069, 27 juillet 2009, révision juillet 2011
We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling...
Francesco Ricci
27 juillet 2009
Gilles Saint-Paul
n° 09-066, 25 juillet 2009
Aditya Goenka et Manh-Hung Nguyen
n° 09-064, 20 juillet 2009
We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium and the moothness of policy function in an optimal growth model with elastic labor supply by using a simple method. Our approach is based on the result of existence of Lagrange multipliers and their representation as a summable sequence due to Le...
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti et François Salanié
n° 09-055, juin 2009
We consider an exchange economy in which a seller can trade an endowment of a divisible good whose quality she privately knows. Buyers compete in menus of non-exclusive contracts, so that the seller may choose to trade with several buyers. In this context, we show that an equilibrium always exists...
Emmanuel Farhi et Jean Tirole
n° 09-052, juin 2009, révision octobre 2010, 49 pages
The paper elicits a mechanism by which private leverage choices exhibit strategic complementarities through the reaction of monetary policy. When everyone engages in maturity transformation, authorities haver little choice but facilitating refinancing. In turn, refusing to adopt a risky balance...
David Martimort, Jean-Christophe Poudou et Wilfried Sand-Zantman
n° 09-053, juin 2009
We analyze the contract between an innovator and a developer, when the former has private information on his idea and the latter must exert efforts but may also quit the relationship after having been informed. We show that the equilibrium contracts distort downwards the developer's incentives but...
