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Michael Fishman (Kellogs school of managemnet, Northwestern)
Toulouse, France, 10–11 septembre 2009
Yuliy Sannikov (Princeton University)
Frank Riedel (University of Bielefeld)
Christopher Harris (Cambridge Business School)
Paul Seabright
8 septembre 2009
Christian Gollier et Jean Tirole
Augustin Landier
6 septembre 2009
Marie-Françoise Calmette
3 septembre 2009
Roberta Dessi
n° 09-075, août 2009
Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete...
Doh-Shin Jeon et Domenico Menicucci
n° 09-074, août 2009
In this paper we study, as in Jeon-Menicucci (2009), competition between sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. This paper considers sequential pricing and complements our main paper (Jeon- Menicucci, 2009) that considers simultaneous...
