Jump to navigation
Jacques Crémer et Bernard Salanié
3 mars 2010
Jean Tirole
Augustin Landier et David Thesmar
février 2010
Martial Dupaigne et Patrick Fève
vol. 21, n° 1, février 2010, p. 69–86
David S. Bullock et Marion Desquilbet
vol. 35, n° 1, février 2010, p. 87–90
Josepa Miquel-Florensa
vol. 99, février 2010, p. 1–28
We study the project allocation mechanisms trade-off between minimizing the waste of resources in the application process and maximizing the match of needs and projects when the recipient’s needs and resources are private information. We propose a signaling mechanism where the set of signals...
David Martimort et Salvatore Piccolo
vol. 2, n° 1, février 2010, p. 204–229
Gilles Saint-Paul
n° 10-144, 2 mars 2010, révision 10 janvier 2011
In this paper, I propose a model of rational inattention where the choice variable is a deterministic function of the exogenous variables, and still only a finite amount of information is being used. This holds provided the choice variable is discrete rather than continuous; that is, the mapping...
Claude Crampes
2 mars 2010
Paul Seabright
1 mars 2010